Why would anybody want to hack your website?
It is a perfectly reasonable question. You might run a small business site, a local community newsletter or a blog documenting your cat’s increasingly unreasonable demands.
You aren’t holding state secrets. You probably aren’t holding much money either.
Unfortunately, the person compromising your site doesn’t necessarily care what you publish. Your website has things they can use: a domain, visitors, storage, processing power and connections to other services.
You are paying for infrastructure. They would quite like to use it.
Money is one of the clearest motivations, but there are several ways to turn access to a website into something profitable.
Take phishing. An attacker can place a fake login page on your domain and direct people towards it. The page might pretend to belong to a bank, an email provider or another business.
Your actual homepage could remain completely untouched. You carry on publishing pictures of Mittens while a directory elsewhere on the site is collecting somebody else’s passwords.
The same principle applies to malicious downloads and redirects. An attacker can use your site to send visitors towards scams or malware. The site becomes part of the delivery mechanism, even if neither you nor your visitors were the original target.
Then there is SEO spam.
A compromised site can acquire pages advertising products you have never sold, links you never added or redirects which only appear under particular conditions. Someone is trying to benefit from your domain and its visibility in search results.
The person buying those links may not even know where they came from. Somewhere along the chain, access to your website has become part of a service being sold. Sucuri’s investigations document both SEO spam and malicious redirects on compromised sites. Sucuri’s hacked-website report
This is one reason “the homepage looks fine” is not much of a security check. Keeping the legitimate site working can help an attacker remain unnoticed.
For an online shop, the checkout provides another opportunity.
Malicious code can be added to collect payment information or deceive customers into entering it into an attacker-controlled form. This is usually described as card skimming.
The details depend on how payments are integrated, but the important point is that an attacker may target information while a customer is entering it. You don’t have to be deliberately storing card numbers in your database for a compromised checkout to cause harm. A documented WooCommerce skimmer investigation
Other attackers may try to make money directly from you.
They might damage or encrypt files, interfere with access, steal information or demand payment under threat of further disruption. A ransom demand is a claim made by an attacker; it does not, by itself, establish what they have actually done.
Either way, a site which is important to your business gives someone a potential means of applying pressure.
Your server’s resources also have value independently of the website.
Depending on the access obtained, an attacker may use the hosting environment to send spam, relay traffic, host malicious files or participate in attacks against other systems.
Cryptocurrency mining is another example. You provide the computing resources and pay the bill; someone else receives any proceeds.
The return from one small server might be unimpressive. Repeating the same approach across many compromised systems changes the economics.
AI services have introduced another version of resource theft. Exposed API keys or stolen cloud credentials can give an attacker access to paid model services. That access can be used or resold while the legitimate account holder receives the charges.
This is often called LLMjacking. Recent investigations describe attackers stealing access to hosted models and cloud resources, rather than needing to build their own infrastructure. Google Threat Intelligence Group’s LLMjacking research
For a WordPress site connected to an AI service, the practical lesson is familiar: credentials stored or used by the site are assets too.
Then there is the information you hold.
Customer details, form submissions, private documents and integration credentials may all be useful to an attacker. What is valuable depends on the site and the access they obtain.
Don’t assume that because the public pages are uninteresting, everything behind them is equally uninteresting. Equally, don’t assume that every compromise involved someone carefully reading your database. You need evidence to establish what happened.
Some attacks are about disruption, publicity or a grudge.
A defaced homepage might carry a political message, an attacker’s name or something deliberately embarrassing. A competitor, former employee or campaign group may have a particular reason to target an organisation.
These possibilities matter, especially where the organisation’s work makes targeted attention plausible. But an attacker does not need a personal interest in your business to compromise its website.
Automation makes opportunistic attacks practical.
A script can look for sites running vulnerable software, try a known technique and record which attempts worked. It does not need to understand your business, read your About page or develop strong feelings about Mittens.
That is why being small or obscure provides little reassurance. If your site is reachable and has a weakness the attacker’s tooling can exploit, it may be useful to them.
An automated attack is still an attack carried out by people. Automation changes how they operate and how many systems they can reach.
There can also be several people involved at different stages.
Imagine someone gains access to a shop and sells that access to another group. The buyer installs a skimmer. Stolen information is then passed to others who specialise in using or selling it.
That is an illustrative chain, rather than a description of every compromise, but it explains why the person who gets in may not be the person who ultimately profits.
Access itself is something which can be traded.
This also explains why removing the most visible symptom may leave the underlying compromise unresolved. Deleting a spam page does not necessarily remove the mechanism which created it, or another way the attacker has arranged to return.
Understanding the motive helps you think about what needs protecting.
Look beyond your published content. Consider the people visiting the site, the accounts which control it, the information it handles and the services it can access.
Your website does not need to be famous to be useful to somebody else.
Mittens may be of limited interest to organised crime. The hosting account paying for his online presence is another matter.
Let’s kick off with a fundamental question. Why do bad actors hack sites? Now, I know what you might be thinking. Why would anybody want to hack my little WordPress website? It’s just a blog about my cat, Mittens, and his existential musings. And while Mittens musings are undoubtedly both profound, the truth is the reasons behind the website’s compromises often has very little to do with the content itself, no matter how cute.
So, let’s break down the common reasons why a bad actor might set their sights on your client’s website. Think of it like this. If your website was a house, what kind of treasures or opportunities might a burglar be looking for? First up, and probably the most straightforward, monetary gain. This is the big one. Most bad actors aren’t in it for the glory. They’re in it for the cash.
How do they make the money from your site? Well, there’s a few ways, but let’s start with malware distribution. They can inject malicious code onto your site and infect visitors. This malware can then steal personal data, plant ransomware, or turn a visitor’s computer into an part of an everinccreasing botnet. There are other options.
They could be running a fishing campaign. Uh so your legitimate domain provides a fantastic cover for fishing attempts. They can create fake login pages that look exactly like PayPal, banks, or even other WordPress websites, tricking users into handing over their credentials.
Then we have SEO spam. This is where your site is used to host spammy links that redirect users to other sites or inflate search engine rankings. The thing is while your site is being hacked, the end user who is buying the links often have no idea what they are actually paying for and those back links or traffic well that’s coming from a hacked site and is ultimately useless. Ransomware.
They lock you out of your sight and demanding a cryptocurrency payment to restore access. It’s like finding a sticky note on front of your door that says, “Nice house. Shame if something happened to it, send Bitcoin.” And then finding the locks on the door have been changed. Credit card skimming for e-commerce sites. This is a nasty one. They inject code that intercepts credit card details as customers enter them, stealing your customer’s card and ultimately the money. Then we have resource exploitation. Your server has power and access and bad actors want both. Cryptocurrency mining, sometimes called cryptojacking.
They hijack your server’s processing power to mine cryptocurrencies. Your site starts running slow, your hosting bill goes up, and you’re inadvertently helping someone get rich off crypto. It’s like secretly plugging their mining rig into your power outlet. Worse, with crypto mining in JavaScript, your visitors are providing that and so your site is even slower and your users are being used to crypto mine. Denial of service attacks and botnetss. Your compromised site can be used as part of a larger network of infected machines, a botnet to launch attacks against other websites or services. Your site can become an unwitting soldier in somebody else’s war. And a new one, large language models, training and fine-tuning. Your site’s service processing power even though it is modest and is a CPU based can be aggregated with many others to contribute to an intensive computational demands that we need of well doing large language models.
This creates a vast distributed system effectively uh using the resources to allow them to use your site to power evil AI instead of chat GBT often without your knowledge. Then there is data theft and espionage sensitive data exposure. If your site stores user data, customer information, or even internal company documents, bad actors might want this. It can lead them to identity theft, corporate espionage, and selling data on the dark web. I think most people think of this when they’re thinking of things being hacked. This is one of the uh least likely things. Most uh bad actors do not know what data is on your site, and they’re not even looking at that data.
But it does happen from time to time. defacement, vandalism. Sometimes it’s just about making a statement and showing off or causing disruption. They replace your homepage with a picture of, say, a rubber duck wearing a tiny somber. Annoying, but often less destructive than many of the others. Finally, a less common but still present reason, grudge attacks, activism, sometimes called activism. This is where individual groups target a site for ideological reasons to protest or simply out of spite and malice. This sort of targeted hack is exceedingly rare and the vast vast majority of attacks are against targets the bad actor has no knowledge about at all. The sad reality is no one hacked your site. It was almost certainly an automated attack that had no human involvement other than hitting the enter key. Now, let’s briefly touch on the business of hacking because make no mistake, for many, this isn’t just some kid in a basement. It’s an organized industry at a colossal scale. And a huge amount of this is due to automation. Chunks of websites compromised aren’t targeted at all. Instead, they’re automated scans that look for vulnerabilities on millions of websites. If your WordPress site has outdated plug-in with a known exploit, it’s leaving your front door unlocked in a bad neighborhood with a giant come on in sign. Automated bots will find it and exploit it without any human intervention.
Then we have as a service models. Believe it or not, you can buy hacking service. Want to launch a DOS? Yeah, there’s a service for that. Need a list of compromised websites to sell? Sure. Here you go, you can find them. This lowers the barrier entry to really less technical individuals. When we use the word scriptkitty, we really aren’t doing it to mean somebody who is like a kid in a basement. We’re just talking about people who have limited to no technical skills. And all of this is based around the fact that the dark web exists and not just like it is in the movies. But dark web marketplaces do provide a place to do compromised data, access to botn nets, and even tools and exploits that can be bought and sold via forums. Your compromised site isn’t just a target, it’s actually a commodity. Consider this scenario and an initial ban actor may exploit a vulnerability on your e-commerce site, but instead of deploying a credit card skimmer themselves, they simply gain persistent access. This actor, essentially a digital key to your site, is then sold on the dark web to another party.
That second actor, specializing in financial fraud, then implants a credit card skimmer. The stolen credit card details are then sold on again, often in bulk to another group. This third group’s role is to validate the cards. They’re effectively testing them with small transactions to ensure they’re active. Finally, these now validated card numbers are resold in large batches to end users who then make well fraudulent transactions on them, completing a complex chain of exploitation that began with that vulnerability on your site.
So, while Mittens musings are safe from direct espionage, the site itself and the server resource it has are ripe for picking. Understanding why they do it in the first place is a crucial step to understanding how to stop them. It could often be hard to truly understand how many sites are hacked, but to put it in perspective, if cyber crime, of which hacked websites, makes the majority, were a legitimate industry, it would be the third largest economy in the world.
The lesson has the following resources:
Sucuri’s 2023 hacked-website and malware report – Examples of SEO spam, redirects and other infections observed in Sucuri’s investigations and scans. Its findings describe that dataset, rather than every compromised website.
WooCommerce card skimmer and backdoor investigation – A documented example of checkout theft alongside mechanisms for maintaining access.
Google Threat Intelligence Group: LLMjacking – Research into theft and resale of access to cloud and AI model resources. This supports the lesson’s AI resource-theft example; it does not establish distributed model training on ordinary WordPress servers.
